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I. Introduction 
Between social media data scandals in the United States,1 
Marriott’s data breach,2 and the alleged election interference by 
Russian hackers,3 the international community has been grappling 
with how to rein in the “data wild west.”4  India’s Aadhaar system 
 
† J.D. Candidate 2020, University of North Carolina School of Law. Managing Editor, 
North Carolina Journal of International Law. 
 1 See generally Social Media Influence: Hearing 115-232 Before the S. Select 
Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2017) [hereinafter Social Media Hearing] (including 
representatives from Facebook, Twitter, and Google). 
 2 See David Volodzko, Marriott Breach Exposes Far More Than Just Data, FORBES 
(Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidvolodzko/2018/12/04/marriott-breach-
exposes-far-more-than-just-data/#1b2afb566297 [https://perma.cc/7PYZ-ZMWR]. 
 3 See Martin Matishak, What We Know About Russia’s Election Hacking, POLITICO 
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/18/russia-election-hacking-
trump-putin-698087 [https://perma.cc/4V5T-Q57F]. 
 4 We Need to Fix the ‘Data Wild West,’ PRIVACY INT’L (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://privacyinternational.org/feature/2677/we-need-fix-data-wild-west 
[https://perma.cc/P6Q9-5H7P]. 
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exemplifies the dichotomy of wanting to use big data for 
convenience and ease, but providing protections on who can use the 
data, what data can be shared, and when an individual’s personal 
data should be used.  This note explores international data privacy 
laws in relation to India. 
Data privacy varies greatly from country to country, and there 
is no one international guideline or way to handle data privacy.  
Most countries follow the European Union (“EU”) approach—
increased protections to personal data privacy.5  However, China 
does not follow that approach, and instead works to completely 
centralize the personal and biometric data of its citizens.6  
Specifically, this note examines where India’s Aadhaar system has 
placed India on a data privacy spectrum—whether it aligns more 
with the EU or China—and how recent proposed legislation affects 
the Aadhaar system.  I will use the perspective of other countries to 
conceptualize where India’s system would fall on this comparative 
spectrum of countries’ values of data privacy.  This note places 
India’s current system on a data privacy spectrum close to that of 
Malaysia and China, but by enacting currently proposed legislation, 
India would be slowly moving towards the privacy ideals of the EU. 
Part II will explain the Aadhaar system, including the Indian 
Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the constitutionality of 
Aadhaar.7  Part III will compare systems along a spectrum of data 
privacy values, including those of the EU, United States, Malaysia 
and China.  Part IV will place India on the data privacy spectrum 
and evaluate the effects of proposed legislation8 on individual 
privacy rights, including whether the proposed legislation, if 
enacted, will curb the negative data privacy implications that 
Aadhaar has on society.  Part V will conclude by noting unanswered 
questions that India will likely have to confront in the near future. 
 
 5 See Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter 
GDPR]. 
 6 See Bernard Marr, Chinese Social Credit Score: Utopian Big Data Bliss or Black 




 7 See K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, 3–4 (India). 
 8  Justice B.N. Srikrishna, A FREE AND FAIR DIGITAL ECONOMY PROTECTING 
PRIVACY, EMPOWERING INDIANS (Committee of Experts under the chairmanship of (retd.) 
Justice B.N. Srikrishna, 2018). 
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II. Aadhaar, An Introduction 
Prior to Aadhaar, Manisha Kamble lived as a “street child” in 
Mumbai.9  With no birth certificate, no address, and no family she 
was “invisible to the state.”10  Manisha was unable to receive 
government assistance, unable to go to school, and unable to vote.11  
Like Manisha, residents without income, citizenship, or addresses, 
and marginalized persons—women, children, senior citizens, 
persons with disabilities, migrant workers, and nomads—are 
particularly vulnerable because they lack access to government 
services.12  Before Aadhaar, millions of citizens were uncounted by 
the government, and it proved to be a major hinderance for welfare 
programs because of the inability to credibly identify those in need 
of welfare.13  Many people received welfare because of fraudulent 
or duplicate forms of identification (“ID”) and, alternatively, many 
people in need could not receive government benefits because their 
IDs were already fraudulently in use.14 
In 2006, the concept of Aadhaar was born “to ensure correct 
identification of targeted beneficiaries for delivery of various 
subsidies, benefits, services, grants, wages and other social benefits 
schemes.”15  Aadhaar launched in 2009, and now almost 1.3 billion 
people are enrolled.16  It allows a person to enter into transactions 
without any ID documents.17  Each person is assigned a unique and 
random, twelve-digit identification number and a registration card.18  
 
 9 Lauren Frayer & Furkan Latif Khan, India’s Biometric ID System Has Led to 
Starvation for Some Poor, Advocates Say, NPR (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/01/652513097/indias-biometric-id-system-has-led-to-
starvation-for-some-poor-advocates-say [https://perma.cc/48KX-5GAT]. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 See Kamakshi Ayyar, The World’s Largest Biometric Identification System 
Survived a Supreme Court Challenge in India, TIME (Sep. 26, 2018), 
http://time.com/5388257/india-aadhaar-biometric-identification/ [https://perma.cc/ZNZ5-
R5KU]. 
 13 See Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 25. 
 14 See id. at 26. 
 15 See id. at 25. 
 16 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION AUTHORITY OF INDIA 1 (2019), 
https://uidai.gov.in/images/state_wise_aadhaar_saturation_as_on_22052017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K5AT-P2UU]. 
 17 Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 3. 
 18 See Ayyar, supra note 12. 
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Meanwhile, the government collects and stores demographic (name, 
address, phone number, birthday, etc.) and biometric (fingerprint 
and iris scans) data.19  The system enables every Indian citizen to be 
recognized by their government, regardless of their income, 
citizenship, or address.20  Aadhaar is used to open bank accounts, 
receive welfare benefits, enroll in school, and more.21  For example, 
the individual’s card or identification number is given to a store 
employee who runs the card through a credit-card-like-machine.22  
The employee authenticates the card using biometrics of either the 
fingerprint or iris scan of the cardholder, and the machine tells the 
employee how much and for what rations the person is eligible.23  
Proponents of Aadhaar advertise the system as fraud proof.24 
Opponents to Aadhaar argue that the system puts a person’s 
most sensitive data at risk to hackers, and it prevents marginalized 
individuals from receiving government assistance because of 
administrative problems.25  Specifically, they argue the system is an 
Orwellian Nightmare—leading India closer to a totalitarian state, 
watched over by “Big Brother,” and further from the data privacy 
rights admired in Western democracies.26  Opponents paint a dreary 
picture of a system that could coerce an individual “to part with core 
information,”27 which the State could use to “profile citizens, track 
their movements, assess their habits and silently influence their 
behaviour.”28  It “diminishes the status of the citizen” by making 
 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Jahnavi Sen, In Rural Jharkhand, Aadhaar Link to Welfare Schemes is Excluding 
the Most Needy, THE WIRE (Sept. 26, 2018), https://thewire.in/government/jharkhand-
aadhaar-pds-pensions [https://perma.cc/H348-6QZ7]. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, 3–4 (India). 
 25 Ayyar, supra note 12. 
 26 See generally Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 53 (noting the benefits of Western 
democracies in terms of privacy from the government). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id.  In other countries, most notably following Venezuela’s elections, food rations 
were conditioned on who the citizens voted for, which the State knew from its 
identification system.  There is worry in India that Aadhaar may someday be used similarly 
to influence political decisions.  See Francisco Toro, Venezuela’s Democracy is Fake, But 
the Government’s Latest Election Win was Real, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/10/17/venezuelas-
democracy-is-fake-but-the-governments-latest-election-win-was-real/ 
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rights of liberty, free choice, and government-mandated 
entitlements all conditioned on “voluntarily” allowing the 
government to access personal biometric and demographic 
information.29 
Not only is the voluntary nature of the program an advertising 
farce for those who rely on government benefits, but the information 
is authenticated by private corporations where data leaks are 
common.30  For example, in a test run by The Tribune, a reporter 
texted a WhatsApp number with his name, email address, and a 
money transfer of only 500 rupees ($7 USD).31   Within ten minutes, 
he was emailed back by the hacker with an “Enrolment Agency 
Administrator ID” and password, giving him access to the Aadhaar 
site and “details of every Indian citizen registered”—including bank 
account and entitlement information.32  Additionally, a high-ranking 
Aadhaar official, R.S. Sharma,  dared “ethical hackers” on Twitter 
to hack his account, claiming that Aadhaar was so safe that it would 
be unsuccessful.33  The hackers accepted the challenge and, within 
minutes, his personal information was released, including his 
address, Aadhaar ID number, phone number, frequent flyer 
identification, and, to prove that the system was completely 
penetrable, the hackers deposited a single rupee into his bank 
account.34 
When the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other 
Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act was passed in 2016,35 the 
Indian Supreme Court was left with the task of determining whether 
 
[https://perma.cc/Y8JK-7UR2]. 
 29 Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 54. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Rachna Khaira, Rs 500, 10 Minutes, and You Have Access to Billion Aadhaar 
Details, TRIBUNE (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/rs-500-10-
minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details/523361.html 
[https://perma.cc/MF5C-2RSF]. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Rachel Chitra, Hackers Deposit Re 1 in Trai Chief’s Account, TIMES INDIA (July 
30, 2018), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/hackers-deposit-re-1-in-trai-chiefs-
account/articleshow/65190556.cms [https://perma.cc/Z8T9-UJU4]. 
 34 Id. 
 35 The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial And Other Subsidies, Benefits and 
Services) Act, 2016, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2016 (India) [hereinafter The Aadhaar 
Act]. 
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the Aadhaar system was constitutionally valid.36  On September 26, 
2018, the Indian Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
Aadhaar.37  The Court focused extensively on the Right to Privacy, 
memorialized in Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution.38  
Specifically, Article 21 protects life and personal liberty, mirroring 
the United States’ Declaration of Independence.39  Privacy is within 
“personal liberty,” and the Court included “informational privacy, 
and privacy of choice” within the privacy protections.40  The Court 
went on to hold that Aadhaar gives Indians a privacy of choice 
through “universal proof of identity” throughout India.41  The 
biometric system protects citizens’ identities from fraud and illegal 
activities.42  Additionally, citizens have an opportunity to travel 
anywhere throughout the country without needing extensive 
documentation.43  In the Court’s interpretation, Aadhaar is a way for 
all citizens to be counted as a part of society.44  The most 
marginalized now receive the benefits “which are actually meant for 
[them],” no matter where they are in India.45 
The Court discussed the administrative problems likely to arise 
during the initial Aadhaar implementation,46 including: no access to 
an Aadhaar ID card because the mail backup takes so long that many 
addresses change before the card and information are received;47 
limited or intermittent internet access that prevents citizens, whose 
 
 36 Id. 
 37 See K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, 3–4 (India). 
 38 Id. at 19.  See also Shayara Bano v. Union of India, 9 SCC 1 (2017) (India) 
(determining that the Right to Privacy is a fundamental right that cannot be taken away 
without the existence of a law that is a legitimate State interest, and the law should pass 
the test of proportionality.  The Supreme Court used Shayara Bano to set the stage for 
holding that data privacy is included in the “Right to Privacy.”). 
 39 See INDIA CONST. art. 21. 
 40 Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 164 (emphasis added). 
 41 Id. at 14. 
 42 Ayyar, supra note12. 
 43 Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 164. 
 44 Id. at 196–97. 
 45 Id. at 85. 
 46 See Ayyar, supra note 12 (noting that some administrative challenges led people 
to return several days in a row to receive rations because of poor internet connection). 
 47 Kritika Roy, Revisiting Aadhaar System: Post the Supreme Court Verdict, 
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES AND ANALYSES (Nov. 2, 2018), 
https://idsa.in/idsacomments/revisiting-aadhaar-system-kroy-021018 
[https://perma.cc/7LN4-VYGB]. 
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biometric data was not input into the offline version, from receiving 
assistance;48 and lack of access for the old and young—faded 
fingerprints and cloudy irises prevent biometric matches with some 
over 60 years old, and children’s fingerprints change as they grow 
older.49  However, despite these administrative issues, the Modi 
Court ruled the positives of Aadhaar far outweighed its 
weaknesses.50 





Historically in the United States, privacy was seen as “the right 
to be let alone.”51  This definition was accepted globally, and it has 
been expanded as countries adapt to changing technologies.  More 
recently, the Supreme Court of the United States defined privacy as 
“the right of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person.”52  However, the extent of individual privacy rights depends 
on the region of the world.  To help compare India’s individual data 
privacy rights with other nations, I have created a data privacy 
spectrum, on which I have placed four countries’ systems: the EU, 
the United States, Malaysia, and China.  These four countries or 
systems were chosen for their comparative value.  The countries are 
placed on the spectrum based on the data privacy protections they 
provide: the EU would lie on one end, providing strict individual 
protections,53 and the United States would fall somewhere in the 
middle of the spectrum.54  On the far end of the spectrum would lie 
 
 48 Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 370 (citing Professor Reetika Khera that the system is 
“wholly inappropriate technology for rural India”). 
 49 Ayyar, supra note 12 (warning that if a person’s biometric verification is denied 
for any reason, they are denied rations); see also Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 313 (noting that 
authentication failures were as high as 49% in 2016). 
 50 Puttaswamy, 10 SCC at 313. 
 51 S. Warren and L. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 220 (1980). 
 52 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added). 
 53 GDPR, supra note 5.  See also Case C–131/12, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española 
de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.  
 54 While the United States is mostly state-driven in the field of data privacy, federal 
regulations include The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 
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both Malaysia’s MyKad system55 and China’s Social Credit System, 
which offer very few individual data protections.56 
Like the United States,57 India does not yet have a single federal 
data protection law, but instead takes a sectoral approach.58  The 
minimal protections that individual Indian citizens do have are 
limited “sensitive personal information.”59  Even this information 
only protects against corporate businesses that automatically 
process consumer data.60  The protections still do not allow 
individuals to control their own data.61  The Aadhaar Act allows the 
Indian government to compile all sensitive personal data in a 
centralized database that it can use without individual consent.62  
Thus, the Aadhaar Act creates a question about how much India 
values individual privacy rights.  It is necessary to address this 
question because technology is constantly changing, companies are 
 
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), The Children's Online 
Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
of 1974 (FERPA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), among others.  See Nancy Perkins et al., California’s 




Original [https://perma.cc/5WNY-JL43]; Jeewon Kim Serrato et al., US States Pass Data 
Protection Laws on the Heels of the GDPR, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (July 9, 2018), 
https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2018/07/u-s-states-pass-data-protection-laws-on-
the-heels-of-the-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/PTZ9-BFQG] (demonstrating that some states are 
using the GDPR as a role model for their own systems). 
 55 Introduction to MyKad, NATIONAL REGISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY 
OF HOME AFFAIRS, https://www.jpn.gov.my/en/informasimykad/introduction-to-mykad/ 
[https://perma.cc/W5U9-JB89]. 
 56 Outline of the Construction of Social Credit System (2014-2020), CREDIT CHINA,  
https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/zhengcefagui/redian/zhengcefagui/201711/t20171122_9
6782.html [https://perma.cc/UX3U-BCBJ] [hereinafter Social Credit System]. 
 57 See infra, Part II(b). 
 58 Data Protection Regulations and International Data Flows: Implications for 
Trade and Development, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 
(UNCTAD) 44 (Apr. 2016) [hereinafter UNCTAD]. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id.  See also Vindu Goel, India Proposes Chinese-Style Internet Censorship, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/technology/india-internet-
censorship.html?utm_campaign=The%20Interface&utm_medium=email&utm_source=R
evue%20newsletter [https://perma.cc/JSD4-ZWMD]. 
 61 UNCTAD, supra note 58. 
 62 Id.  See also The Aadhaar Act, supra note 35. 
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becoming more reliant on consumer data, and therefore, personal 
data privacy is increasingly at risk.  Technology changes much 
faster than laws and regulations, so the government must react 
quickly to the changing technological landscape to ensure 
individuals can safely and securely benefit from its advancements. 





The General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) is based on 
the belief that “personal data is a fundamental right,” established 
through the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union63 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”).64  The GDPR presumes that “[n]atural persons should 
have control of their own personal data[,]” even in a technology-
focused world where personal information is often publicly 
available and incredibly valuable.65  The protections are very 
broad—regulating the processing of personal data by an individual, 
a company, or an organization in the EU.66  Personal data is also 
defined in broad terms as “any information” that, when collected 
together, could lead to an individual being identified,67 including 
data that has been de-identified or encrypted through 
“pseudonymization,” but could still be used to identify a person 
when put together with other information.68  It forces all public data 
to be anonymized through an irreversible process.69 
Additionally, the GDPR restricts any means of processing data 
in the public sphere, without freely-given consent by the individual 
in an effort to ensure the information collected is limited to what is 
necessary, accurate, secure, and not stored for longer than is 
 
 63 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 
364/01) Art. 8(1). 
 64 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Dec. 13, 2007, 2012 O.J. (C 
326/10). 
 65 GDPR, supra note 5, at recital 7. 
 66 See id. arts. 1–2. 
 67 Id. art. 4(1). 
 68 Id. art. 26. 
 69 Id. 
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necessary.70  It covers all international companies doing business in 
the EU that process data—whether automated or non-automated.71  
In particular, the GDPR goes further than other regulations in the 
rights given to the data subject.  Article 14 allows the data subject 
to receive information regarding his or her collected personal data,72 
Article 15 allows the subject to access the data,73 and Article 16 
allows the data subject to rectify any inaccurate personal data 
“without undue delay.”74  Finally, Section 3, Article 17, “Right to 
Erasure (‘right to be forgotten’),” allows the data subject to erase 
certain personal information “without undue delay.”75  If the 
personal data is no longer necessary, consent is withdrawn by the 
subject, the data was unlawfully processed, or when the subject is a 
minor and his or her guardians did not provide consent, the data 
must be erased immediately upon request.76  The GDPR places a 
high value on an individual’s personal data, allowing each 
individual substantial freedom to control what information can be 
processed and when that data must then be erased. 
Technology companies that rely on consumer data information 
have been forced to adapt in the EU.  Consent must be “freely given, 
specific, informed, and unambiguous.”77  As one GDPR expert has 
termed, this has led to a new era of “beg data.”78  “Freely given” 
means that the data must be “truly optional.”79  “Specific” means 
that companies now must state exactly for what purpose they will 
 
 70 Id. arts. 4–5 (noting that the GDPR does not apply in the private sphere). 
 71 What Constitutes Data Processing, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/what-constitutes-data-
processing_en [https://perma.cc/K6ZD-6RXA] (defining processing as the “collection, 
recording, organization, structuring, storage, adaption or alteration, retrieval, consultation, 
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment 
or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction of personal data”). 
 72 GDPR, supra note 5, art. 14 (“Information to be provided where personal data 
have not been obtained from the data subject”). 
 73 Id. art. 15 (“Right of access by the data subject”). 
 74 Id. art. 16 (“Right to rectification”). 
 75 Id. art. 17, sec. 3 (Right to Erasure (“right to be forgotten”)). 
 76 Id. (listing five exceptions to when personal data cannot be erased). 
 77 GDPR, supra note 5, art. 4.  
 78 Tim Walters, Welcome To the Era of “Beg Data,” LINKEDIN (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/welcome-era-beg-data-tim-walters-ph-d-/ 
[https://perma.cc/R2NN-2RLM]. 
 79 Consent, GDPR EU, https://www.gdpreu.org/the-regulation/key-
concepts/consent/ [https://perma.cc/P48Q-N5ZG]. 
2020 INDIA'S DATA WILD WEST 629 
use each piece of data.80  Information collected can only be gathered 
for the purpose that is specifically laid out to the consumer.81  
“Informed” means that the company must use plain language that is 
unambiguous.82  In other words, affirmative action such as checking 
an “accept” box must be taken; silence is not an option.83  Therefore, 
companies must adjust to the new requirements and change how 
they collect and use data.  They can no longer use any data for any 
purpose, but they must have a plan in place as to how they will 
collect and use consumer data.  Spending has increased in order to 
navigate the GDPR and to comply with its restrictions.  The GDPR 
proves that, through increased regulation, giant corporations can be 
tamed and the “data wild west” can be civilized. 





Similar regulations of individual data privacy do not exist in the 
federal system of the United States, placing the United States’ 
system towards the middle of a data privacy spectrum.84  The United 
States does not have any “centralized, formal legislation at the 
federal level;” instead, it follows a “sectoral approach” that relies 
on a combination of state-enacted regulations and self-regulation by 
businesses.85  Federal statutes that do exist are aimed at specific 
 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See Data Protection Law, LEGAL RESOURCES, https://www.hg.org/data-
protection.html [https://perma.cc/F38J-TTY6]. 
 85 Id.  However, as noted in Social Media Hearing, supra note 1, Facebook and other 
technology companies are not quick to self-regulate.  See also Mike Isaac, Why Everyone 
Is Angry at Facebook Over Its Political Ads Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/technology/campaigns-pressure-facebook-
political-ads.html [https://perma.cc/ZN72-KW6R] (noting that Facebook will not fact-
check political ads, but after lots of internal pressure, Google has decided to fact-check 
political ads).  In general, when businesses are left to self-regulate, they are slow and often 
have a financial incentive, so it is unsettling to think that individual data privacy will be 
left for businesses to self-regulate under the current system in the United States. 
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sectors of the economy, and do not have the breadth of the GDPR.86  
Also contrary to the GDPR, the United States’ hands-off approach 
allows the private sector to lead the way in data protection, 
encouraging individuals to self-regulate which companies and 
electronic sources have access to their personal information, and to 
what extent.87 
Unlike the EU, which considers data privacy a guaranteed 
“fundamental” human right, the United States Constitution does not 
explicitly enumerate privacy as a fundamental right.88  While 
privacy is implied in the penumbras of the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court has never held that data privacy is included as a 
fundamentally protected Constitutional right.89  Several states have 
enacted legislation mirroring the protections of the GDPR in an 
effort to provide their constituents with greater transparency, 
notifications, and control over their data, but no federal legislation 
has been enacted.90  The results yield great confusion over when 
protections must be afforded, and more money spent by companies 
to determine when and how privacy must be protected.91  In fact, 
over 25% of U.S. companies have spent over $1 million since 2018 
to ensure compliance with the GDPR—if they have businesses 
abroad—and state privacy protections, and 10% of companies have 
been forced to spend above $2.5 million.92 
While most of these states have only enacted “breach 
 
 86 Data Protection 2018: USA, INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDES (Dec. 
6, 2018), https://iclg.com/practice-areas/data-protection-laws-and-regulations/usa 
[https://perma.cc/NR7H-CAU6].  For example, federal laws protecting data privacy in the 
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notification laws” that require businesses to alert their consumers 
when any personal information is compromised,93 California has 
gone further by enacting the California Consumer Privacy Act of 
2018 (“CCPA”).94  The CCPA resembles the GDPR because it: 
applies to domestic and international companies doing business in 
California; expands what qualifies as personal information; 
mandates disclosure to consumers regarding use of personal 
information; allows consumers to access information that details 
how their information is being used; prohibits businesses from 
changing how they treat consumers based on whether or what data 
they consent to share; and permits consumers to opt-out of sharing 
their data which, at times, must be completely erased.95  
Specifically, the CCPA restricts access to sensitive data without 
consent, and selling and sharing personal information like email 
addresses and telephone numbers.96 
The CCPA was passed in response to massive breaches of 
personal information and, while not all fifty states have a breach 
notification law in place, other states may soon follow California’s 
lead.97  Further, with the recent congressional hearings involving 
social media sites,98 it is possible that Congress could enact more 
sweeping data privacy legislation.  For now, the United States’ 
passive, piecemeal approach to regulation is not as protective as the 
GDPR, but it affords some moderate protections. 
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On the other side of the data privacy spectrum—opposite the 
EU—are Malaysia and China. Malaysia was the first country to 
develop a Government Multi-Purpose Smart Card (MyKad)—
similar to the Aadhaar Card in India—that incorporates services 
from various sectors of the government into a single card.99  The 
card stores biographical information100 and fingerprints.101  The 
government’s main uses for the MyKad card in 2018 were to 
confirm identities, births, and deaths, but the card has many more 
functions as well.102  MyKad is used for email, e-banking, online 
transactions, electronic public services, business licenses, overseas 
travel, and other services, including highway tolls, public 
transportation, and even theme parks.103  Separate cards are issued 
to children, immigrants, and temporary residents.104 
There is little doubt among Malaysians that MyKad’s ability to 
put all documents on a single card provides convenience, but having 
to carry an identity card everywhere—that identifies a person’s 
immutable characteristics, including demographic and biographic 
information, health records, banking links, public transportation 
records, and digital identification mechanisms—is often associated 
with authoritarian regimes.105  It is easy to conjure up many 
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 100 See id.  The biographical information includes: Name, Address, Race, Citizenship 
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instances in which a person’s personal data can be used by a third 
party.106  Now, with MyKad, all of that information is on a single 
card, where the chip can be “read,” “recorded,” and sold to third 
parties.107 
In 2013, Malaysians received some limited protections through 
the Personal Data Protection Act 2010 (“PDPA”).108  However, the 
PDPA only prevents the misuse of personal data in commercial 
transactions, including “matters relating to the supply or exchange 
of goods or services, agency, investments, financing, banking and 
insurance.”109  It does not apply to the federal or state governments, 
leaving open the threat of malfeasance by the government.110  “Big 
Brother” still has access to the data, without regulations because 
Malaysia does not have the protections like the GDPR.111  There is 
no right of rectification if data is incorrect, no right to view that 
information, no right to consent to what information is made 
available, no restrictions on sale of data, and no right to be 
forgotten.112  Simply, the PDPA protections are weak. 
When he was asked about the lack of individual privacy, the 
MyKad project director simply stated that the personal information 
on a MyKad card “is no big deal and doesn’t compromise your 
privacy in any way . . . military people have always carried a special 
ID and in no way has it impeded their freedom.”113  Recently, 
Human Resources Minister M. Kulasegaran recognized the security 
issues faced by the MyKad card, especially involving personal 
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identification card system with something similar to India’s 
sophisticated Aadhaar model that uses unique random 12-digit 
numbers.”114  Even India’s card, which this Article critiques for its 
few protections, affords more protections to Indian citizens than the 
MyKad card because MyKad does not even have minimal security 
protections from hackers, thieves, and third party data buyers.  For 
now, without many security and privacy protections in place, 
Malaysia places more emphasis on government surveillance than it 





A financial credit score is a common function in the United 
States that rates a person’s financial trustworthiness to give 
investors an indication of risk, such as how likely repayment will be 
and at what rate the interest will be set.  China is using “high-tech 
and big data”115 to create a “social credit scoring system” that, much 
like its financial cousin, will rate your social trustworthiness and 
your risk to the government.116  The Chinese system uses personal 
consumer data to gauge how likely an individual is to engage in 
unlawful activity and determines what social advantages they will 
have, including shorter hospital lines, better travel deals, and rental 
discounts.117  Individuals with a lower social credit score may be 
restricted from buying luxury items, train and airline tickets, or an 
apartment, and they may be blocked from dating sites, or their 
children may be blocked from attending the best schools.118  When 
the Chinese government glimpses that an individual buys diapers or 
 
 114 Zurairi AR, Minister: Malaysia Eager to Swap MyKad with India’s Aadhaar 




 115 See What Is Big Data?, BERNARD MARR, 
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plays video games without using cheat codes, his credit score goes 
up; however, if he purchases alcohol or plays video games for most 
of the day, his social credit score may suffer.119  Even the choice of 
online friends and one’s community reputation will be a factor.120 
The data used in compiling a social credit score comes from 
many sources, including basic personal information, financial 
records, health records, and all digital communication.121  From the 
cookies in online sites to the information entered on company 
websites, the Chinese government is constantly watching and 
monitoring its citizens.  The system tracks social media, voting 
records, legal issues, criminal history, tax history, financial history, 
health-tracking applications, GPS applications, personal 
relationships with family and friends, and uses facial recognition 
software to constantly track movements.122 
China views the social credit system as a way to utilize the 
readily available big data and artificial intelligence (“A.I.”) 
algorithms to “lead [China] to a new era in upstanding citizenry.”123  
While online data in the United States is “curated, collected, 
monetized and sliced and diced in all sorts of ways,” it is through 
the private sector, not through big government, and has little relation 
to individuals’ interactions with other sectors of the economy.124  
For China, the social credit system is an integral part of the “socialist 
market economic system . . . [to] promote the tradition of 
integrity . . . [and] improve the integrity and credit level of the 
whole society.”125  China is attempting to reform the economic 
system, achieve scientific development, accelerate social 
transformation, and expand globalization efforts, and it sees the 
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social credit system as the way to develop the guiding ideology and 
principles that will be vital to its future development.126  Much like 
Aadhaar, the government believes that the personal data gained 
from companies through technological advances will create ease in 
everyday tasks and allow for even greater wealth. 
Critics of the social credit system describe big data as a 
nightmare, because citizens’ lives will soon, if not already, revolve 
around their social credit worthiness, and they have no control over 
the information.127  Critics also point to hacking concerns; however, 
when stories of hacking are raised, they are immediately deleted, 
and the dissenting whistleblowers quickly receive a negative change 
in their credit score.128  “Big Brother” is in control over every facet 
of a Chinese citizen’s life, and there is no individual say in what 
personal information is used by the government.129  China’s use of 
big data to restrict data privacy puts China on the opposite end of 
the data privacy spectrum from the EU. 





While most Western democracies have opposed any databases 
where personal individual information, including biometric data, is 
centralized, India has designed Aadhaar to use personal, sensitive, 
“big data” to “cut out the middleman, eradicate corruption and to 
ensure that subsidized goods and services reach the deserving 
recipients.”130  While Aadhaar is not that similar to the Social Credit 
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System, it raises many of the same data privacy concerns as the 
MyKad system,131 placing India closer to Malaysia on a data privacy 
spectrum.  First, Aadhaar, like MyKad, is designed for services 
across all sectors: from a welfare distribution system, to email, e-
banking, and even social media.132  Aadhaar provides easy access to 
a wide range of services.133  However, needing to carry an 
identification card for everyday affairs is like carrying one’s health 
records, public transportation records, banking information, and 
more sensitive information everywhere one goes.134  This need for 
constant identification is often associated with authoritarian 
ideals.135  Second, there is no protection against abuse by “Big 
Brother.”136  Like MyKad, the few data protections that do exist 
currently only apply to the use of sensitive information by private 
sector businesses.137  Similarly, there is no right to consent to what 
information is made available.138  While it is not yet mandatory to 
carry the Aadhaar card as proof of identity for Indian citizens,139 an 
Aadhaar identity is becoming increasingly necessary for success in 
society.140  India has not yet reached the point of GDPR-like 
protections. 
The GDPR is the gold standard that countries should strive to 
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achieve,141 but the Aadhaar program conflicts with the goals of the 
international community.  The Constitution of India protects 
“informational privacy,”142 and assumes that Aadhaar protects 
informational privacy because of its fraud prevention measures.143  
Yet, no Indian law indoctrinates personal data privacy as a 
fundamental right, like the GDPR does.144  Additionally, Aadhaar 
information is anonymized, but the process is reversible, as 
evidenced by the numerous data breaches.145  Increasingly more 
sensitive information is included in the Aadhaar database, and more 
private companies require Aadhaar information as a way to check 
individual security.146  Private companies profit on this information, 
without fully securing the information, which puts millions of 
citizens at risk.147 
The global trend in democratic countries is to give more 
protections to individual data privacy;148 however, India’s Aadhaar 
system contradicts this trend by, instead, keeping India locked into 
the perception of being more like the state-restrictive system in 
Malaysia.  India certainly does not come near China in terms of the 
restrictions on individual data privacy, but it must make certain to 
advance away from the surveillance state of its north-western 
neighbors.  Aadhaar has not yet begun to influence social behavior 
by rewarding compliance and punishing those with social 
disadvantages, but the Aadhaar system does interact with other 
sectors of the economy.149  The goals of the Aadhaar system and 
China’s Social Credit System also align—both governments cite 
their respective systems being vital to future development.150  The 
ease of providing services to citizens and the ability to know what 
 
 141 See generally, UNCTAD, supra note 58, at 32–34 (discussing the GDPR). 
 142 Constitution of India, art. 21.  See also Puttaswamy, Writ Petition No. 494 of 2012, 
at 164. 
 143 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 
364/01) Art. 8(1). 
 144 Id. 
 145 See Khaira, supra note 31. 
 146 See Jebaraj, supra note 140 (explaining that “private micro-payment systems, 
airline and telecom companies, and more are demanding Aadhaar information to ascertain 
your identity”). 
 147 See Khaira, supra note 31. 
 148 See GDPR, supra note 5; Perkins, supra note 54; Serrato et al., supra note 54. 
 149 Dormehl, supra note 120. 
 150 See Social Credit System, supra note 56; see also Ayyar, supra note 12. 
2020 INDIA'S DATA WILD WEST 639 
citizens need are the underpinnings of each system.151  The Aadhaar 
system is not as intrusive as the Social Credit System; however, 
India must take active steps to avoid the possible abusive behavior 
by bad actors who may use the Aadhaar system to open the door to 
data privacy exploitation, as seen in China today.  Luckily, India’s 
government has recognized many of the issues with Aadhaar and 
has proposed steps to secure individual data. 
A. Steps by India’s Legislature: “A Free and Fair Digital 
Economy: Protecting Privacy, Empowering Indians” 
India’s legislature seems to have already recognized some 
potential problems, and is in the process of taking concrete steps to 
solve its data privacy issues by borrowing many ideas from the 
GDPR.152  The government appointed former Indian Supreme Court 
Justice, BN Srikrishna, to chair the Committee of Experts on a Data 
Protection Framework for India (“Committee”) to “create the legal 
framework for data protection and data privacy in India.”153  The 
race for individual data in the wild west of big data is much like the 
gold rush, and the Committee has sought to secure these data 
privacy rights for the Indian citizens before data is no longer private. 
The Committee released a proposed 200-page-plus bill to the 
legislature in July 2018.154  It recognized the benefits of big data on 
India’s citizens, including the ease, range, and affordability of 
services that could be provided one day.155  However, the 
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Committee cautioned that the harms associated with using big data 
include unexpected data sharing, tracking online behavior—
including on intimate matters—and breaches of privacy.156  The 
premise of the report is based on the Aadhaar case, Puttaswamy v. 
Union of India, and the holding that individual privacy is a 
fundamental right, but allowing the Aadhaar system to continue 
cautiously.157 
There are four primary actions that the Committee 
recommended.  First, the entity that seeks an individual’s data is 
given a fiduciary role which, much like the GDPR, demands the 
entity respect the data entrusted to it.158  This allows data subjects to 
hold the third-party liable if their data is misused in any way, and 
requires that data subjects be notified if their data is breached or 
used without permission.159  Second, entities can only collect the 
information that is necessary to the service that the company 
provides.160  For example, Facebook cannot collect healthcare 
information because that is not necessary to the social media service 
that it provides, but it could collect—with permission—data relating 
to internet cookies that could be used to improve their services.161  
Third, the committee recommended establishing a Data Protection 
Authority (“DPA”) to adjudicate data privacy claims and both 
penalize entities and award damages to individuals.162  The bill 
would prevent all “sensitive data” from being stored in a central 
facility; instead, the bill mandates that all personal, sensitive data be 
locally stored, restricting Big-Brother-type-data-use.163  Finally, like 
the GDPR, the Committee recommends limited instances of data 
erasure.164  However, unlike the EU’s “Right to be Forgotten,” the 
Committee only recommended the right of erasure when using 
personal data becomes “unlawful or unwarranted” because “the 
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right to privacy [must] be balanced with the freedom of speech.”165 
Specifically related to the Aadhaar Act, the Committee 
recognized the large impact on informational privacy.166  It strongly 
advocated for immediate changes to protect against “companies 
wrongly insisting on Aadhaar numbers, [] using Aadhaar numbers 
for unauthorised purposes and [] leaking Aadhaar numbers.”167  The 
Committee recommended two major solutions to this problem.  
First, the Aadhaar Act must be amended to set up two groups of 
entities—those allowed to access Aadhaar information online and 
those restricted to verifying identities offline only—in an attempt to 
prevent Aadhaar data breaches.168  The legislature must decide on a 
limited group of entities, central to national interests that have 
access to the online identification, but the Committee recommended 
that private companies be completely excluded, relying exclusively 
on verifying identities offline.169   
Second, since over 1.3 billion people have Aadhaar cards, and 
many services require Aadhaar identification, the legislature must 
create a regulatory framework that includes the ability for the DPA 
to hear and enforce complaints regarding the misuse of data.170  The 
Aadhaar number should be added to the list of “sensitive personal 
data,” to prevent private entities from storing that information and 
to prevent foreign companies from accessing that information.171  
The second part of this recommendation is of particular importance.  
If a company wants to process Aadhaar data for security checks, or 
if a company wants to store any general, non-sensitive information, 
it must set up a physical location in India.172  For example, 
Facebook, to store any general information, even if it is not 
sensitive, would have to set up a physical location in India to store 
the Indian citizen’s data.173  Facebook would not be able to store 
Indian data in the United States or elsewhere. 
The Committee’s proposed legislation would increase the data 
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security of the Aadhaar program, compartmentalize the 
information, and increase the regulatory framework.  While the 
changes would likely decrease data breaches, it does not sufficiently 
address data privacy concerns—what information can be accessed 
by private entities and what restrictions exist on the central 
government’s access. 
V. Conclusion 
Implementing the Committee’s recommendations would 
significantly improve India’s protection of individual data privacy.  
The proposed legislation reflects much of what the GDPR regulates: 
citizens must consent to information being shared, personal 
information cannot leave the country without certain precautions, 
and individuals have a right to legal action when personal data is 
misused.174  However, while the Committee recognized a right to be 
forgotten, its proposal limits when information may be erased by 
balancing the right of erasure against competing rights and interests, 
including freedom of speech.175  The individual must formally 
request erasure through the DPA adjudication process, and erasure 
must only be performed when it is absolutely necessary to protect 
the individual.176  Additionally, the Committee’s data breach 
proposal does not go far enough in protecting the privacy of its 
citizens.177 
While the Aadhaar system has and will continue to provide 
citizens with immense benefits, there needs to be increased 
regulation with regard to how the system protects data privacy.  The 
proposed legislation by the Committee is a start, but there are many 
questions that remain unanswered and a lot of work that must be 
done.  
One issue that has jumped to the forefront of Aadhaar is how the 
act will interact with the Citizenship Amendment Act (“CAA”).178  
The CAA permits religiously prosecuted “Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, 
Jain, Parsi or Christian [persons] from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or 
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Pakistan. . .” to receive protections in India.179  These minority 
groups will not be treated as illegal immigrants and the 
naturalization requirement is reduced from eleven to five years of 
residency.180  The Act excludes Muslims from protection, further 
separating religious communities by further splitting the country 
into Hindu vs Muslim.181  Some Muslim residents, who have lived 
in India for multiple generations, are denied the benefits of an 
Aadhaar card because their birth certificates do not denote Indian 
genealogy.182  President Modi, who campaigned against big 
government and government interference, has increased data 
surveillance, in part through Aadhaar. While the Supreme Court 
stated that “[t]he Aadhaar number . . . shall not, by itself, confer any 
right of, or be proof of, citizenship or domicile in respect of an 
Aadhaar number holder[,]”183 the CAA designates the Aadhaar card 
as one way to prove citizenship.184  Data privacy protections grow 
more important as the reach of the Aadhaar system is used as a tool 
for religious discrimination.  
Additionally, the proposed regulations should go further to 
guarantee more data that can be erased, increase opportunities to 
consent to data, limit private sector access to prevent against 
security breaches, and apply strict limits to data access and use by 
the central government. India’s constitution values privacy as a 
fundamental right, so data privacy should be protected as such.  
There is a push and pull between the proposed legislation and 
Aadhaar and currently, the legislation has been tabled by the Indian 
Parliament.  If India truly desires to “shape the global digital 
landscape of the 21st century, it must formulate a legal framework 
relating to personal data that can work as a template for the 
developing world.”185  As the world of technology continues to 
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grow, India has the ability to lead the revolution.  India must 
institute protections so that Aadhaar can be beneficial while also 
upholding its citizens’ fundamental right of privacy. 
 
